It’s been over a month since the Egyptian army overthrew Mohamed Morsi at the demand of huge masses of Egyptian citizens, who went out in every square and every street calling for Morsi to step down. Morsi would not step down, thereby forcing the military to isolate him and pass on power to the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, now Egypt’s Interim President, Adly Mansour. Since then both the media and political circles worldwide have been polarized over whether to call it a revolution or a coup d’état, with most international media outlets calling it a coup.

It’s been over a month since the Egyptian army overthrew Mohamed Morsi at the demand of huge masses of Egyptian citizens, who went out in every square and every street calling for Morsi to step down. Morsi would not step down, thereby forcing the military to isolate him and pass on power to the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, now Egypt’s Interim President, Adly Mansour. Since then both the media and political circles worldwide have been polarized over whether to call it a revolution or a coup d’état, with most international media outlets calling it a coup.

Egypt needs to revert back to the democratic path,” is a common line thrown in our faces from every Tom, Dick and Harry across the world. Egypt’s leaders diplomatically respond with the roadmap of election, constitution drafting and the rest of the plan they have in mind.

Ramadan this year has hardly been a month of contemplation and reflection for most Egyptians. It is hard to remember in recent years a time when the situation has been more tense, more difficult, and more on edge. It seems, however, owing to international pressure, the brakes have been applied (if only momentarily) on the rising temperature – and at no point in the past month has there been a better time to impress upon all parties the sense of urgency for closing a political deal. What can that deal look like?

Two weeks ago I read in the news that my friend Mohamed Nour Farahat, a law expert, blamed me for making an appearance on Al-Jazeera satellite channel. On his Twitter account, he said, "Your scientific and political history are too good for you to appear with questionable figures on Al-Jazeera Mubasher[Masr] to discuss issues brought up by media that serve a specific agenda against Egypt. Even if your talk was balanced, the truth will be lost in the midst of those devils. Sending across a media message is about taking a position."

For the millions of non-politicised Egyptians who were in the country's squares and streets on 30 June in a successful attempt to get rid of Mohamed Morsi, it makes no difference whether it was a coup or a revolution. The majority is literally not able to differentiate between the two.

Behind sandbags at the Muslim Brotherhood's protest camp in Cairo, an activist urges supporters to embrace martyrdom.

While many Egyptian intellectuals and politicians are scrambling to present various recipes for a roadmap for the future, everyone agrees on one thing: the need to “hold elections,” both parliamentary and presidential, within the next few months.

For three years, Egyptians have been taking to the streets demanding democracy, social justice and freedom, and for three years they have been denied. They are being cornered over and over into making tough choices, then end up choosing what they deem “less horrible” and the results have never lived up to their aspirations.

Lurking in the dark for the current government, hidden in every step tread, is the path dictated by a methodological flaw. It is not the characteristic of the wise to fish for others' mistakes, or lie waiting for them to happen. But it is also not palatable that criticism begins from the first day with the same intensity that accumulated during a whole year, as was the case with the previous government.

While many Egyptian intellectuals and politicians are scrambling to present various recipes for a roadmap for the future, everyone agrees on one thing: the need to “hold elections,” both parliamentary and presidential, within the next few months.

The Coptic Cathedral in Abbasiya in Cairo is the seat of the pope of the Coptic Church. It also has seminaries, a dormitory for nuns, and a facility for the manufacture of clerical garments. Due to the recent sectarian tensions in the country, it also has a lot more security and far fewer visitors than it used to have before.

When Egyptians poured onto the streets in their millions to demand the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, few thought they would return two years later demonstrating for the overthrow of the man they elected to replace him.

In the past few weeks, Egyptians have suffered from the political unrest sweeping the country, often leaving violence and death in its wake. Opposing camps assign blame and level accusations to where the responsibility lies in passionate interviews and carefully constructed press releases, with each camp claiming to hold a monopoly on the truth – the whole truth and nothing but.

As we move ahead as a nation with a new transition plan, it’s important to note who is and who isn’t a player in this new phase, and where they fall in this new state order. People who are out of the stage of influence are both the Muslim Brotherhood and the independent Jan 25 revolutionary symbols: the former due to being the party that this revolution was created to oust, and the latter due to their usual inherent and systemic problems (lack of organisation, mixed messaging, in-fighting, etc.) coupled with a record-low popularity amongst the Egyptian public, who fairly or unfairly, after the mess of the past three years, no longer trust them or their judgment very much. Their unease with the post-30-June Egypt, while completely understandable, has placed them on the fringes of an explosively polarised political scene where there is no room for a nuanced position, for now anyway.

Revolution may be the art of the impossible, but politics is the art of the possible. Many of Egypt's revolutionaries are disappointed with the country's new cabinet. Muslim Brothers make disparaging comparisons between “their” prime minister, Hesham Kandil, barely 50, and Hazem el-Beblawi, the newly appointed premier, who is 77 years old. The Brothers, trying to find allies among Egypt's revolutionary youth, note how the “coup” is resurrecting figures from the Mubarak era and style of government, but even that audience turns a deaf ear to their grumbling.

It is no secret that the current political events in Egypt are dealing the Muslim Brotherhood perhaps the biggest blow in their 85 year history. I would dare say that this is much more severe than the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna or the execution of Sayyid Qutb.

What is happening in Egypt cannot be reduced to a simple conflict between Islamists, secularists and the military. It is a fundamental clash over conflicting concepts of “freedom”.

Time magazine chose the people of Egypt as its cover story in the last issue. The magazine divided a magnificent photograph of the masses on the streets demanding the ouster of Mohamed Morsi into two: one titled "World’s best protesters" and the second shaded in red as the "World’s worst democrats".

(They are) distracted in mind even in the midst of it ― being (sincerely) for neither one group nor for another. (Al-Nisa, 143). Oh Allah, show us truth and grant us the will to follow it. Morsi's legitimacy was compromised before the army's intervention. It fell when millions took to the streets to demand his departure and to call for early presidential elections. Morsi could have, no he rather should have, taken the initiative before 30 June, to call for a referendum or early presidential elections, when it became clear that the protests would feature millions, and then he had another chance after the massive protests.

In fact, the army had not really left the political scene since Morsi dismissed the defence minister and head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and Chief of Staff Sami Anan, in August 2012. Under the latter duo, the army had first run the country since the fall of Mubarak, in a transition period of 16 months, and then, after the election of Morsi in June 2012, wanted to maintain an extremely dangerous duality of civil-military power that would inevitably lead to a collision between the presidency and military institution. This confrontation was quickly ended, against all odds, with the dismissal of Tantawi and Anan less than two months after the inauguration of Morsi.